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The gender-blind
approach which has long characterised the
sociology of religion not only ignores gen-
dered difference, but assumes that the mas-
culine point of view is normative. Since the
1970s this perspective has gradually been
challenged, not least by empirical studies
whose findings make it much harder to ig-
nore the salience of gender differences in
the realms of religion and spirituality
(Woodhead 2001). As yet, however, the
classical theories of secularisation which still
dominate the discipline have not been in-
terrogated by a gendered approach. This
paper offers some preliminary suggestions
about possible implications for such theo-
ries of a broadening of their perspective to
take account of the situation of women as
well as men in the modern world. The aim
is to show that the gendering of secularisa-
tion theory has the potential to enhance its
explanatory power. 
What follows is intended to be sugges-
tive and provocative. My aim is to open up





Are major theories of secularisation
gender blind? And have men's expe-
rience of modernisation been made
central to explanations of religious
decline? Greater attention to wom-
en's distinctive experiences can help
answer these questions and extend the
explanatory power of secularisation
theory. 
new avenues of exploration, rather than to
present a systematic new (gendered) theory
of secularisation. I will focus on two of the
most important classical narratives of secu-
larisation – those of Weber and Marx – and
on one of the most influential re-formula-
tions of these narratives – that presented by
Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried
Kellner in The Homeless Mind (1974). I will
make suggestions about what happens once
we begin to ‘gender’ these accounts of se-
cularisation, and in doing so will make re-
ference to a selection of both qualitative
and quantitative data which has a bearing
on the enterprise. This data will be drawn
from English-language sources, and will
chiefly relate to the British Isles. I will occa-
sionally make reference to data relating to
other parts of Europe and north America,
chiefly for the purpose of comparison. Se-
cularisation is a multi-dimensional concept,
which may refer to the decline of engage-
ment with the sacred in (a) society (b) the
sphere of religion itself (c) the life of the in-
dividual (Dobbelaere 2002). Though the
narratives of secularisation with which I be-
gin cast their nets widely, in the discussion
that follows I will concentrate chiefly on
(b), focusing in particular on changes in
Christian life and thought, including the
decline of church attendance and member-
ship. 
NARRATIVES OF SECULARISATION
Amongst many other things, Karl Marx and
Max Weber bequeathed to the sociology of
religion two powerful narratives of seculari-
sation which have exerted an influence ever
since. The first tells how modern individu-
als have come to dwell in an ‘iron cage’;
the second how they have come to dwell in
a ‘crumbling cage’.1
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism (orig. 1904-5) and elsewhere,
Weber looks back on a pre-modern world
which was imbued with sacred and myste-
rious meaning. Meaning lay deep below –
or high above – the immediate surface and
utility-value of things, and was articulated
by way of the powerful images, stories,
worldviews and rituals of religion. Moder-
nisation, however, has involved a progres-
sive demystification and disenchantment of
the world, as transcendent meaning has
been pushed aside to make way for the
more pressing and immediate needs, de-
mands and protocols of industrial capi-
talism. “The tremendous cosmos of the
modern economic order”, writes Weber
(1996), 
is now bound to the technical and economic
conditions of machine production which to-
day determine the lives of all the individuals
who are born into this mechanism… with ir-
resistible force (p. 181).
The result is a world which is governed and
shaped not by sacred meaning but by the
harsh and impersonal standards of a ‘ratio-
nalised’ and ‘bureaucratised’ order whose
only aim is greater productive efficiency.
Human beings become cogs within ma-
chines that neither appreciate nor accom-
modate their feelings, hopes, desires and
dignity. Their ‘soft’ selves are crushed and
constrained to fit into the hard and imper-
sonal structures of the factory, the office,
and the organisation. From being a mere
means to serve the greater and more fulfill-
ing ends of human life, the production and
consumption of external goods becomes
the motive force driving both individual
and social life. “In Baxter’s view” com-
ments Weber (1996), 
care for external goods should only lie on the
shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak,
which can be thrown aside at any moment’.
But fate decreed that the cloak should be-
come an iron cage […] Of the last stage of
this development, it might well be truly said:
‘specialists without spirit, sensualists without
heart’ (p. 181). 
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Religion has a threatened and precarious
place in the rationalised world of the iron
cage, for at least two reasons. First, that
which supplies the world with mystery and
meaning can have no place in a world
governed by rational-scientific modes of
thought. There is no need to bless crops
when fertiliser produces more consistent
results; no point in casting out demons
when medicine offers more reliable cure;
no purpose in spending hours in prayer
when the time could be spent making
money. Indeed, religion comes to be seen
as a positive hindrance to progress: super-
stition which must be routed by reason, an
assemblage of priest-ridden institutions
which must be swept away and replaced by
more efficient forms of social, political and
economic organisation. Second, as social
functions are parcelled out into different
spheres of specialised activity for the sake of
greater efficiency, so a new public world
comes into being in which religion loses its
place. The spheres of law, education, wel-
fare, politics and so on become differentia-
ted from one another and from the sacred.
Increasingly they run along rational-bu-
reaucratic lines. No longer responsible for
shaping the values and aspirations of society
as a whole, religion must be content with
trying to retain a hold over the private lives
of individuals. 
Marx’s story is different from Weber’s –
or at least the emphasis falls differently:
Not on an iron cage but on a crumbling
cage. For Marx what differentiates indu-
strial capitalism from what preceded it is –
amongst other things – the sheer pace of
change. The authority of ‘tradition’, of the
way that things were always done, gives
way to the authority of capital. Revolution
succeeds revolution, as more efficient
modes of production give way to one
another at an accelerating pace. As Marx
and Engels put it in one of the most fre-
quently quoted passages of The Communist
Manifesto (orig. 1848): 
Constant revolutionising of production, un-
interrupted disturbance of all social condi-
tions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation…
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train
of ancient and venerable prejudices and op-
tions, are swept away, all new-formed ones
become antiquated before they can ossify. All
that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is
profaned (1977, 224).
Unlike Weber, Marx has little nostalgia for
religion and its “venerable prejudices”; in
his view its main effect is to inure the op-
pressed to their suffering. Like Weber,
however, he sees the costs for human life of
the new modes of existence called into be-
ing by the industrial age. Rather than life
being shaped around human meaning
which can be reverenced and sustained, it is
alienated from itself by the demands placed
on it by the constantly changing modes of
production which characterise the capitalist
system. 
At first sight the images and narratives of
iron cage and crumbling cage appear in-
compatible: how can that which is rigid,
fixed and constricting also be melting, dis-
solving and shape-shifting? One of the
achievements of Berger et al’s The Homeless
Mind (1974) was to show that far from be-
ing mutually exclusive, the two may be wo-
ven together to form a single narrative of
even greater explanatory power than each
possesses on its own. For not only is it the
case that the life of modern individuals is
constrained by iron cages which are not
responsive to the quest for meaning and
significance, it is also the case that these
rigid structures are constantly being super-
seded and rendered redundant by other
equally rigid and meaningless cages. One’s
life may be shaped by one set of discourses
and practices – say that of heavy manufac-
turing industry – but within the same life-
time one may see that way of life rendered
obsolete by a shift towards service industry.
For the flows of capital that characterise the
modern globalised economy are no re-
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specters of personally- and socially-mean-
ingful forms of life. 
The effect, according to Berger and his
co-authors, is to undermine the overarch-
ing ‘sacred canopies’ which once made
sense of social life by relating it to wider
economies of meaning – like the world of
gods and spirits. For example, fixed forms
of agricultural practice were once rendered
meaningful by being related to myths and
rituals which explained their origins and cy-
cles of fertility, but the ‘agro-businesses’ of
today can admit no meaning beyond the
generation of profit for their owners and
shareholders. The land loses its sacredness,
and cultivation becomes purely mechanis-
tic. Similarly, where patterns of gender and
class relations could once be explained and
sanctified by being mirrored by divine hie-
rarchies and sacred stories, now human re-
lations are cut free from any wider contexts
of meaningfulness. We all become de facto
social scientists, capable of seeing through
what was once held sacred to the function
it performs and the interests it serves. Un-
der these conditions the forms of religion
which suffer the most serious loss of plausi-
bility are those which were once most ef-
fective in serving as sacred canopies over
(pre-modern) forms of life. As the latter are
undermined, so too are the religions which
once made them seem sacred. 
Thus Berger’s account of secularisation
states that pluralism – not only of contem-
poraneous but of successive forms of life –
undermines plausibility and leads directly
to secularisation.2 This does not mean the
end of all sacred belief and practice. Un-
able to find adequate meaning either in the
public world or in the forms of religion
which once partnered it, the modern mind
finds itself ‘homeless’, and is thrown back
on its own resources. The only place in
which meaning and value can now be loca-
ted is in the depths of one’s own subjective
life, and the forms of the sacred which do
best will be those which are able to re-
source the quest for inner significance.3
Before moving on from this brief survey
of secularisation narratives, it is worth
drawing attention to a basic assumption
with which they tend to operate, namely
that society is composed chiefly of (a) pri-
mary institutions – like the workplace, the
legal profession and associated institutions,
the political establishment, higher educa-
tion and so on – which are large-scale (ope-
rative throughout society), public, and as-
sumed to be central to the healthy func-
tioning of (modern) society and (b) the in-
dividual self who is thrown into and up
against these institutions without having
any choice in the matter. The significance
of this model of society – and its gendered
assumptions – will become clearer in what
follows. 
GENDER AND SECULARISATION IN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
Because they take male experience to be
normative, the narratives of secularisation
under discussion assume that modern men
and women are affected in exactly the same
way by the harsh captivity of the iron cage
and/or by the destabilising effects of the
crumbling cage. Once we take account of
gender difference, however, this assump-
tion comes into question. We can examine
some implications of the gendering of secu-
larisation theory first in relation to industri-
al society (particularly the 19th century, at
least where Britain is concerned), then in
relation to late industrial society (particu-
larly from the 1960s). 
Although there is considerable debate
amongst historians about the nature of
women’s work in the pre-modern and early
modern periods, there is greater agreement
about the fact that industrial capitalism is
characterised by strong differentiation of
male and female labour.4 The former now
takes place within the public world of of-
fice, factory or field, whilst the latter – in-
creasingly – takes place within the ‘private’
world of the home. The former is economi-
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cally rewarded, whilst the latter is not. Of
course this simple picture needs to be qua-
lified in a number of ways, not least by tak-
ing into account class differences. Since few
working class households could afford for
their womenfolk not to work for pay, work-
ing class women were more likely to under-
take paid employment than middle class
women. This class variation does not, how-
ever, qualify the general picture of differen-
tiation between the male ‘public’ work and
female ‘domestic’ work as much as might
be supposed, because (a) even those
women who worked for pay still had to
take prime responsibility for domestic
labour and (b) a great deal of women’s paid
work was piece-work which was carried out
within the home. Moreover, even the
women who were engaged in paid labour
outside the home tended to be engaged in
‘domestic’ forms of labour – most impor-
tantly domestic service, teaching and nurs-
ing (Abrams 2002).
In other words, it was men who were
likely to find their lives and labour shaped
by the iron cage and the crumbling cage
rather than women – for it was men who
entered the public world of paid work
rather than women. Likewise, it was men
who were likely to be shaped as – and to
think of themselves as – lonely and isolated
individuals struggling against the imperson-
al, bureaucratic, but ultimately imperma-
nent structures of primary institutions. By
contrast, the vast majority of women would
have found themselves located primarily or
exclusively within a domestic context –
within the home, within the family. As
such, they would be far less likely to experi-
ence society as a set of primary institutions
which throw the individual back on his or
her own personal resources. They would be
shaped, instead, by domestic experience
and the roles and duties of daughter, wife,
mother, aunt, grandmother and so on.
Women’s mode of selfhood, in other
words, was likely to be domestic-relational,
whilst men’s was much more likely to be
atomistic-individual. (Since accounts of the
development of modern selfhood tend to
be gender-blind, they naturally tend to fo-
cus on the rise of the latter mode of self-
hood – see, for example, Abercrombie,
Hill, Turner (1986)). 
Relating this back to religion and theo-
ries of secularisation, for men ‘public’ reli-
gion is likely to be undermined by the ra-
tional disenchantment of the world and by
the profanation of ‘timeless’ truth by the
onward march of change. For women,
however, such depredations are likely to
have far less impact on traditional religious
commitment. For one thing, women are
not absorbed into a world dominated by
rational-scientific modes of thought and ac-
tion, and so are less likely to become disen-
chanted with the supposedly irrational or
superstitious nature of religious belief. For
another, since they are not as subject to the
effects of rapid change, they are less likely
to find that the sacred canopy which ‘en-
chants’ their own lives as it did that of their
mothers and grandmothers is undermined
by the forward march of progress. Women
are also less likely to be thrown back on the
resources of the solitary self, for the inter-
mediate organisations of family and neigh-
bourhood – including many churches5 –
still shape the self through regular and
meaningful contact with other people (not
merely with ‘cogs’ in machines). 
One thing that gendered secularisation
theory might therefore lead us to expect –
in quantitative terms – is that in industrial
societies there will be fewer men than
women active within the churches (and
probably in other forms of religious activity
as well). More concretely still, we might ex-
pect to find that as societies industrialise, so
men’s church attendance and membership
will decline at a faster rate than women’s.
Although data on church attendance and
membership in Britain differentiated by
gender is relatively rare,6 it does seem to
lend some support to this expectation. The
fullest information is supplied by Clive
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Field (1993), who surveys a range of diffe-
rent sources of information, most impor-
tantly Nonconformist (particularly Baptist
and Congregationalist) church membership
records. Drawing on the latter, he finds
that between 1750 and 1800 there was a
three-fifths female majority in Baptist and
Congregational membership, whereas after
this period it rose to a two-thirds majority
– perhaps as industrialisation took hold?
(see Table 1). 









Table 1: Women as a percentage of all members in
Baptist and Congregational Nonconformity, 1651-
1950: Combined figures by quarter century.
Source: Field (1993, 66)
Of course we have a great deal more undif-
ferentiated data which allows us to gauge
overall patterns of church growth in indus-
trial Britain. Here the best survey of various
sources is that presented by Currie, Gilbert,
and Horsley (1977). The picture that
emerges is of little or no growth in the
1700s, except amongst nonconformists, of
growth between 1800 and 1840, and lower
growth between 1840 and 1910, and de-
crease after 1910 and 1970 (pp. 21-38).
Far from leading directly to decline, indus-
trialisation therefore seems to have led to
growth, for a short time at least. Could this
be because even though some men were
defecting, women remained far more loyal
to the churches and active within them?
And can women’s continuing allegiance ex-
plain why decline was not more precipi-
tious between 1910 and 1970? We cannot
say for sure, given the lack of evidence. We
do, however, know that by the start of the
twentieth century women were preponde-
rant in British Christianity and have re-
mained so ever since. For example, Robin
Gill (2003) finds that in London and York
at the beginning of the 20th century church
attendance was predominantly female; and
in the USA Robert and Helen Lynd
(1929) found women accounting for about
60% of churchgoers in ‘Middletown’ in
1924-1925 (p. 355). For an overview of
the voluminous post-war evidence on
women’s greater involvement, see Argyle
and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, 71-9). 
The explanatory and predictive gains of
the gendering of secularisation theory are
somewhat easier to assess in relation to
qualitative material, where data is more
abundant. What gendered theory would
lead us to expect is not only a drawing
apart of the realms of public life and church
life, but a drawing closer of the realms of
family life and church life – such that the
former is Christianised and the latter is
feminised and domesticised. Historical
studies of church and society in both Eu-
rope and America seem to bear out this
prediction across a range of different areas. 
For one thing, there is considerable evi-
dence that both Protestant and Roman
Catholic churches placed increasing empha-
sis upon the value of the family and domes-
tic life in industrialising society (Roper
1989, Davidoff and Hall 1987, Woodhead
2004). The shift was particularly striking
within the Catholic Church which, in pre-
industrial society, had attributed only a
qualified and secondary importance to the
family, with the celibate and monastic life
being considered a higher calling. By the
19th century, however, the ‘holy family’ in
the heavens had become a model for the
(nuclear) family on earth (Heimann 1995,
Kennelley 1989). 
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In addition, women’s role and status in
both heaven and earth receives new atten-
tion and validation from church authorities,
with the Roman Catholic Church – for ex-
ample – declaring the dogma of the Im-
maculate Conception of Mary in 1854 and
the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary
in 1950. At the same time, the role of mor-
tal woman is attributed new dignity, insofar
as woman exemplifies the virtues of chasti-
ty, humility, maternal care, and obedience
(the virtues of the convent are popularised
and domesticised). At the same time,
churches become internally ‘feminised’,
with serious consequences for their power
and prestige in society, and for that of their
male clergy (Douglas 1978, Hartman
2001). As the masculinity of church and
clergy is called into question, so there arise
reactions including repeated calls for more
‘muscular’ forms of Christianity which can
win back the men and the boys (Putney
2001). 
Dominant images of God also undergo
corresponding changes. Emphasis on the
harsh, commanding, angry and even arbi-
trary God worshipped and honoured as a
‘King’ and ‘Judge’ gives way to emphasis
on a gentler, kinder, more considerate and
loving God who displays universal benevo-
lence towards his creatures (Nichols 1989).
Whilst remaining unquestionably male, this
God takes on more fatherly, loving and
caring characteristics. Jesus is also pictured
as an idealised lover or husband who is
caring and considerate, kind and good,
commanding and strong (Clark-King 2005,
Woodhead 2005, 128-145). 
Thus a gendered perspective allows us to
see that church decline in industrial society
is likely to be due to male rather than fe-
male defection (with continuing female ad-
herence slowing down the process), and
that a ‘domesticisation’ and ‘feminisation’
of religion also takes place as religion is in-
ternally transformed by male defection and
de-identification. 
GENDER AND SECULARISATION
IN LATE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
(FROM THE 1960S)
If women’s lives were far less directly af-
fected than men’s by iron cage and crum-
bling cage in industrial times, this situation
changed significantly in the watershed peri-
od after the Second World War when in-
dustrial society give way to late industrial
society across much of the west – and in
some other parts of the world. One of the
many changes which took place was a far-
reaching shift in women’s status and roles
in society, which involved (amongst other
things) their entry into the paid workforce
in unprecedented numbers. The latter de-
velopment had begun earlier in the 20th
century, was given impetus by labour short-
ages during the two World Wars, and con-
tinued at a rapid pace after the 1960s. As
Ferber (1998) puts it: 
Women’s labor force participation has been
increasing in most of the world. In the Uni-
ted States, for instance, it began rising late in
the nineteenth century. At first it increased
slowly from 18.2 per cent in 1890 to 27.9
percent in 1940, then far more rapidly to
58.9 per cent in 1995 (p. xii).
This can be compared with the very similar
situation in the EU in which 60% of
women were active in the workforce in
2001 and 78% of men (Thewlis, Miller,
Neathey, 2004). 
Women’s entrance into the public
sphere, even if not on equal terms with
men, would nevertheless bring them into
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direct contact with the stresses and strains
of iron cage and crumbling cage as never
before. Taking this into account, a gen-
dered theory of secularisation can predict
an increased rate of defection from the
churches from the 1960s onwards. If
women as well as men are now growing
disillusioned with Christianity we can also
expect to find that rates of church decline
will increase significantly. The most reliable
data from the UK is certainly compatible
with this scenario (see Table 2). If we step
even further back in time to 1851 when
Mann carried out his famous census of Re-
ligious Worship in England and Wales
(1854), the percentage of the population
attending church on census Sunday was
around 39 per cent, although this may fall
to about 24 per cent if those who attended
two or more times are only counted once
(Gill, 1993). Overall the picture is one of
gradual decline in both membership and at-
tendance after 1910, with a short ‘blip’ of
growth in the 1950s, followed by accelerat-
ed decline from the 1970s to the present –
decline which currently shows no sign of
slowing down. (Whilst the nature of the si-
tuation in the USA is highly debated, there
is growing evidence that there has also
been significant secularisation there since
the 1970s. For a review of the evidence see
Heelas and Woodhead (2004), 55-68.) 
Congregational Membership (% of population)
1900 1930 1960 2000
33 29 24 12
Typical Sunday attendance (% of population)
1903 1951 1979 1989 2000
19 15 12 10 8
Table 2: Church decline in Britain (source: Heelas
and Woodhead 2004, 139). 
Thus whilst gender-blind theories of secu-
larisation struggle to account for the gath-
ering pace of secularisation after the 1960s,
a gendered approach has far less difficulty.
If secularisation is due simply to the un-
folding of the stories of secularisation out-
lined at the start of this essay, then it is
hard to see why it should suddenly speed
up in the last quarter of the 20th century.
But once we acknowledge that the secular-
ising pressures which had long affected
men are suddenly brought to bear on in-
creasing numbers of women as well, the da-
ta becomes much easier to interpret. So far
as we can tell, the ratio of women to men
has remained fairly steady within the
churches in the 20th century, but this still
means than greater numbers of women
than men have defected during this period,
hence speeding up the overall rate of de-
cline. (A gendered approach can also help
explain the ‘blip’ of church revival in the
1950s. The immediate post-war years wit-
nessed a brief revival of the domestic ideal,
and of the idea of ‘separate spheres’ for
men and women. (See Tyler 1988). For
reasons explained above, this would natu-
rally go hand in hand with a return to
church on the part of women and families.)
It is, however, too simple to see wo-
men’s labour patterns as simply being as-
similated to men’s from the 1960s on-
wards. Though they may be diminishing,
there are still very significant differences
between the patterns of male and female
labour, attention to which can yield still
more information about the nature of re-
cent secularisation – and sacralisation (i.e.
the decline of traditional ‘religion’ and the
growth of new forms of ‘spirituality’). 
Three main differences emerge as parti-
cularly significant. First, women are still
disproportionately engaged in part-time
paid labour. In 2001 they made up more
than four-fifths (81.4%) of all part-timer
workers in the EU (Thewlis, Miller and
Neathey, 2004, 23). Second, women still
carry out the bulk of unpaid caring work,
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including childcare, housework and care of
elderly dependants. Arlie Hochschild’s
study of dual-earner parents, for example,
finds that men share the domestic work in
only 18 per cent of households, and most
women still did most of the work (1989, p.
20) (compare Brannen and Moss’s similar
findings in the UK, 1991). Given the high-
er rates of women’s paid employment, this
means that women are generally working
longer hours than men, particularly women
with dependants. Third, there is still gender
segregation in the workforce, with women
disproportionately represented in lower-
paid ‘caring’ and ‘service’ roles, for exam-
ple (see Table 3). Such segregation has,
however, lessened somewhat since 1970s.
To quote Ferber (1998) again: “Only in re-
cent decades has there been evidence of
some decline [in occupational segregation]
in many economically advanced countries…
The index of segregation [which shows the
percentage of female or male workers who
would have to change occupations in order
to duplicate the distribution of the other
group] had been 64 in 1960 and 66 in
1970, but had declined to 55 by 1990” (p.
xv) (see also Wharton 2005). 
Overall then, the picture of women’s
labour (paid and unpaid) is more variegated
than that of men’s labour. Women find
themselves in a range of different work po-
sitions, of which three seem particularly im-
portant: First, women employed full-time
in primary institutions, who may be expect-
ed largely to share the same experience of
labour and the workplace as men. Second,
women who are employed full- or part-
time in primary institutions, but who also
have prime responsibility for the care of
children and other dependants. Women in
this category will often find their lives di-
vided between primary institutions (and
paid labour) and secondary institutions,
particularly the family (and unpaid labour).
In the popular jargon they find themselves
‘juggling’ two very different sets of de-
mands and two incompatible standards of
behaviour and evaluation (the rationalistic,
utilitarian-individualist and the relational,
domestic). Third, women whose lives are
lived primarily in the context of family and
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Table 3: Female share of employment by occupation, 2001
Occupations Denmark % Ireland % UK %
Legislators, senior officials and managers 23.0 27.9 30.0
Professionals 40.0 51.7 39.6
Technicians and associate professionals 56.1 42.0 46.6
Clerks 73.1 73.9 78.9
Service workers and shop/market sales workers 78.4 64.1 76.1
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers and 
elementary occupations 41.8 33.3 45.7
Craft and related trade workers 5.4 5.8 8.3
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 25.3 22.7 17.3
All 46.4 40.9 44.9
Source: Thewlis, Miller and Neathey 2004, p. 17
domestic care, and who are not employed
in primary institutions (or only in ‘domes-
tic’ forms of care, such as part-time care of
children). 
What are the implications of this varie-
gated picture of women’s work for reli-
gious belief and commitment? It is possible
to hypothesise that each of the three differ-
ent subject- and work-positions will have
an elective affinity with a different religious
or spiritual stance. Thus in the first catego-
ry women who share a typically male expe-
rience of the workplace – and thus of iron
cage and crumbling cage – are likely to find
this equally corrosive of religious commit-
ment. In addition, women’s alienation
from Christianity in particular may be the
greater if the latter is experienced as rein-
forcing the domestic values which these
women no longer endorse – since these
moral imperatives tend to bear down more
heavily on women than on men (Brown
2001). 
The situation for those women in the
second category who ‘juggle’ work and
home may be rather different. Since they
are caught between two different sets of
norms, values and expectations, they may
chose to privilege one over the other. If
they privilege the role of autonomous
agent, they may be alienated from Chris-
tianity. If they privilege the role of wife,
mother, carer and relational agent, they
may be much more likely to continue to
have a church commitment, and to find
within the church validation and legitima-
tion for their domestic roles. Alternatively,
however, the ‘jugglers’ may find themselves
experiencing some sort of cognitive disso-
nance, and seek some way of integrating
and ‘centring’ their fragmented experience.
So far as the sacred is concerned, they may
find help in this regard in the many forms
of ‘holistic’ spirituality which have prolife-
rated since the sixties (particularly in the
last decade or two). As we discovered in re-
cent research (Heelas and Woodhead
2004), holistic spirituality caters predomi-
nantly for women, as well as being predom-
inantly ‘run’ by women (in Kendal in the
UK where we carried out our research, 80%
of those engaged in holistic spirituality
both as practitioners and clients were fe-
male). What is more, such spirituality is pri-
marily concerned with catering for the
stresses and strains of female life, including
dealing with issues of overwork, stress, and
lack of self-confidence. On the one hand,
women’s work of care and relationality is
affirmed. On the other, great stress is
placed on the imperative to care for the
‘wellbeing’ of the self, and to realise that
only if one cares for oneself can one care ef-
fectively for others. Thus the sacred is en-
gaged to resource and refresh the depths of
one’s subjective life, as well as to endorse
caring and responsible relation with others. 
By contrast, those women whose prima-
ry and overriding roles remain those of wife
and mother within the domestic setting are
the most likely to find that themselves shel-
tered from the corrosive effects of moder-
nisation – of iron cage and crumbling cage.
For them, the churches’ legitimation and
support of women’s caring roles and of the
family in general may provide a haven in a
late capitalist society which tends to value
autonomous rather than relational-dome-
stic selfhood. Thus a number of empirical
studies of conservative Christian and Jewish
groups and organisations in the USA find
that they are highly successful in attracting
– and in some cases converting – women
with families. For example, Griffith (1997)
shows how the conservative Christian ‘Wo-
men’s Aglow’ movement validates women’s
work of care by combining traditional
Christian teaching with some therapeutic
emphases to help them ‘cope’. She cites a
prayer from Aglow in the Kitchen, a cook-
book for Christian wives, which shows very
clearly how Christianity sanctifies domestic-
ity: “Jesus, thank You for showing me that
housework is sacred. Help me to realize
while I am cooking and cleaning that I am
doing them for You because You are living
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here and my husband is Your representa-
tive” (p. 182). Similarly Davidman (1991)
finds that orthodox synagogues succeed in
attracting often highly educated American
women who wish to dedicate their lives to
raising children, supporting husbands, and
creating strong family units. 
CONCLUSION
There is much in this paper which is specu-
lative rather than well-established, provoca-
tive rather than definitive. One aim has
been to show that classical accounts of se-
cularisation tell only a part of the story, for
they have in mind chiefly men and the life-
worlds and life-stories of men. The other
has been to indicate how much this gender-
blind perspective fails to see, and how illu-
minating it may be to consider the life-
worlds of women as well as men. There is
no attempt to offer an alternative theory of
secularisation – an enterprise which would,
in any case, involve taking cognisance of
many more factors and theories than can be
discussed here. Rather, the attempt has
been made to show how the power of some
of the most influential existing theories can
be enhanced and extended by the simple
expedient of taking gender difference more
seriously. 
NOTER
1. There is a growing recognition that ‘theories’ of
secularisation have persuasive as well as descriptive
force. See, for example, Martin (1969). 
2. Berger has now modified his theory to state not
that pluralisation leads to secularisation, but that it
leads to a change in the way in which religion is
‘held’ – i.e. with less objective certainly and more
subjective commitment. See Berger (2001). 
3. This argument is developed by Heelas and
Woodhead (2005) to explain their recent findings
concerning the decline of religion and the growth
of spirituality in the UK. They develop it into what
they call the ‘subjectivisation thesis’, which states
that those forms of spirituality which resource in-
ner subjective life are likely to flourish in contem-
porary (subjectivised) culture, whilst those forms
of religion which fail to perform this function are
likely to suffer. 
4. See, for example, Abrams 2002, Cancian 1987,
Elshtain 1981, Kanter 1977, Wharton 2002.
5. Churches can be viewed both as primary and in-
termediate institutions: Public insofar as they are
national (or international) with a presence which
transcends that of the local congregation; interme-
diate insofar as they are local, often neighbour-
hood, institutions. Some churches – like state
churches – are more obviously primary, whilst 
others – like independent congregations – are
more obviously intermediate. 
6. Clive Field (1987) offers a guide to survey and
opinion poll data to 1984 which contains disag-
gregations by sex.
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SUMMARY
Major theories of secularisation have been
gender blind, with the result that men's expe-
rience of modernisation has been made cen-
tral to explanations of religious decline. This
paper attempts to show how greater attention
to women's distinctive experiences can help
extend the explanatory power of secularisati-
on theory. It begins by introducing two main
‘stories' of secularisation, articulated by We-
ber and Marx, which have shaped much sub-
sequent theory about religious decline. Look-
ing first at industrial society, it shows how the
distinctive experiences of modernity, which
Weber and Marx discuss, have to do with lar-
gely masculine forms of labour. Women's la-
bour, far more confined to the domestic sphe-
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re, would not necessarily have had the same
secularising impact  –  which may help expla-
in why industrial modernity witnesses only
relatively gentle rates of congregational decli-
ne. Women's continuing commitment to the
churches also helps explain many transforma-
tions in the nature of Christian belief and
practice in the modern period.  Moving into
the period of late modernity, from the 1960s,
the paper notes a significant increase in the
rate of church decline in recent decades, and
suggests that this can be explained in terms of
changing patterns of women's labour, as dif-
ferentiation between male and female work
begins to diminish. Persistent differences,
however, including women's continuing dis-
proportionate responsibility for the work of
care, continue to impact upon the nature of
male and female religious and spiritual
participation in contemporary west-ern soci-
eties.
Linda Woodhead, Senior Lecturer in Christian
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